Foreign bride price: A Papua New Guinea guide to ‘marrying’ multiple partners

Polygamy, still practiced in some parts of Papua New Guinea, symbolized wealth and status in the country’s so-called “big man” culture. The greater the fortune a man accumulated, the more wives he could support, with each wife contributing to managing the family’s estate. 

Central also to marriage is bride price – a ceremony bringing together two families with an exchange of monies, pigs and produce. It’s not always a one-way transaction, but nowadays is usually more onerous on the groom’s side.

In 2022, the director of the controversial Kikori Special Economic Zone in PNG – created with seed funding from Beijing – was asked if Australia or China was the preferred partner. The interview was for an Australian news report on the growing Chinese influence in PNG, particularly in the development of commercial ports which some argue could serve dual civilian-military purposes. 

He responded by referencing the PNG “kastom” that lingers in some parts, stating, “… we come from a culture where you marry three or four wives.” This metaphor suggested that PNG does not view its foreign partnerships as an either/or scenario. Consistent with its foreign policy of “friends to all, enemy to none,” PNG maintains multiple transactional relationships with Australia, China and other partners.

Despite its substantial natural resources, PNG does not seem to have the economic independence or prestige to support multiple such “marriages.” But what it lacks in immediate financial wealth, due to a plundering political elite, it makes up for with geo-strategic significance on the cross-roads between the Pacific and Asia.

There are many prospects. Traditional ally Australia, for instance, provides about US$400 million in loans to PNG annually to support its budget, with an additional US$125 million now promised for law and order. The U.S. is expected to spend US$864 million for security initiatives on the defense cooperation agreement, while the European Union has allocated US$25 million to anti-corruption programs.

Furthermore, PNG has access to multiple regional funds committed by the same partners. In 2018 for example, Japan, U.S, Australia and New Zealand collectively pledged US$1.7 billion for PNG’s electricity infrastructure. These commitments were aimed at countering China’s growing involvement in areas such as electricity and internet connectivity. 

However, according to the Lowy Institute’s Pacific Aid Map, Australia provided significantly more official development assistance to PNG between 2008 and 2022 than China. During this period, Canberra pledged US$12.8 billion and spent US$11.7 billion, compared with US$6.6 billion promised by Beijing and US$2.8 billion actually delivered.

While the aid figures may appear generous, the competition between the West and China has led to the securitization of developmental assistance in recent years. For example, the recently announced US$400 million by Australia to fund PNG’s participation in the National Rugby League includes an implicit condition; PNG must refrain from signing a security deal with China for the next ten years or be ejected again.

Although the details of this agreement are not public, the funding arrangement relies on the leverage Australia can exert by withholding or distributing the funds in installments, enabling the use of a carrot-and-stick strategy. Alternatively, once a PNG team is in the NRL and if Australia were to kick them back out, then that may end up as an own goal. No hearts and minds will be won by punishing the population of its nearest neighbor for the actions of their political elite. 

Although such agreements may deter a formal security deal with China, they are unlikely to significantly diminish China’s influence in PNG. The country’s construction sector, including work on most major infrastructure projects, is dominated by Chinese companies. Notably, many of these projects are financed by multilateral organizations such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB), predominantly funded by Western nations. 

In an ironic twist, the West indirectly supports China’s presence in PNG through these multilateral initiatives, even as it actively seeks to curtail  Beijing’s influence. There has also been a resulting steep increase in the number of small- and medium-size Chinese companies operating in PNG. Of the 1800 foreign companies controlled by Chinese nationals or entities – almost double the number of Australian ones – less than 5% have more than 50 employees.

While it is improbable that PNG will sign a security agreement with China soon, the West cannot prevent China’s presence and growing clout in the country. China may not need to match the money West spends in PNG, and may not even require a military base to exert influence. Through initiatives like preferential trade access offered to PNG – ranging from coffee to fisheries products – China has already cemented significant economic ties. 

Apart from the European Union, which offers an interim Economic Partnership Agreement focused on tuna trade with PNG, no Western nation competing for an alliance has matched the breadth of trade agreements provided by China. 

While the West may not want PNG to add China to its family of partners, the reality is that it has already occurred, bringing its own strengths and qualities to contribute to the family’s wealth overall. And while the competition for influence keeps PNG looking like an attractive match, with new potential partners continually calling in on the Pacific, the existing ones may find themselves sharing the bed with even more.

Michael Kabuni is a PhD student at the Australian National University and formerly a lecturer at the political science department at the University of Papua New Guinea. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of BenarNews.